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EX PARTE BILLINGS
lective Service System had been so contrary to the evi-
dence as to be arbitrary and capricious. Certainly, the pe-
titioner was entitled to no more. It is questionable if the
petitioner was entitled to that much.1"
TIME WHEN DRAFTEE FIRST BECOMES
SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW
Ex Parte Billings'
Petitioner claimed exemption from military service as
a conscientious objector.2 Both the Local Draft Board and
the Appeal Board denied this claim, and petitioner was
ordered to report to the reception center. Petitioner re-
ported there and passed the physical examinations, but
then refused to take the oath of induction. After having
been sent to the guardhouse, petitioner applied for a writ
of habeas corpus. The writ was denied.
The sole function of the writ of habeas corpus is to
"determine whether the person seeking the benefit of it is
illegally restrained in his liberty."'3  Here the immediate
problem was whether the Army had jurisdiction over the
petitioner. The importance of this question was shown by
the fact that had the Court decided that petitioner was en-
titled to a civil trial rather than a court martial, it was
probable that petitioner would have walked away scotfree.
As he had fully complied with the requirements of the Se-
lective Training and Service Act, it was doubtful whether
1 See Note, Judicial Review of Selective Service Board Classifications by
Habeas Corpus (1942) 10 G. W. L. Rev. 827, 841-844. A quaere might be
raised as to whether the Court had doubts as to the appropriateness of
the review under petition for habeas corpus where the ground for review
was only that the fact determination of the Local Board and the Appeal
Board was arbitrary. The opinion was prefaced by the observation: "Nor
is any question raised as to the propriety of the procedure in applying for
the writ of habeas corpus." Cf. Larson, The Doctrine of Constitutional
Fact (1941) 15 Temple Univ. L. Q. 185, 199 et seq., for a discussion of types
of judicial review appropriate for various kinds of fact-finding by admin-
istrative boards.
146 F. Supp. 663 (D. C. Kan., 1943).
50 U. S. C. A. 305(g) : "Nothing contained in this Act shall be con-
strued to require any person to be subject to combatant training and
service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of
religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form . . ."
$HART, AN INTRoDUCToN To ADImimTATIm LAW (1940) 480.
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he had committed an act for which he could be prosecuted
in the civil courts.4
The decision turned upon the interpretation of the Se-
lective Training and Service Act which provides that
".. . No person shall be tried by any military or naval
court martial in any case arising under this act unless such
person has been actually inducted for the training and
service prescribed under this Act or unless he is subject to
trial by court martial under laws in force prior to the en-
actment of this Act . . ."' The effect of this provision is
illustrated by the case of U. S. v. Rappeport.6 Defendants
were indicted for failure to register for the draft. In the
course of its opinion, the Court pointed out that a party
who registered under the Act would not, by that act, be
subject to military jurisdiction, since no person is to be
tried by court martial until he has been actually inducted
for training.' The provision above referred to harmonizes
with the decisions under that part of the Articles of War
which stipulates that those subject to military law include
"all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into,
or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the
dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft or
order to obey the same."'
Among the many cases holding that persons inducted
into military service thereby become subject to military
jurisdiction are Ex Parte Tinkoff9 and U. S. v. Bullard,10
decided under the Selective Draft Act of 1917. In the
Tinkoff case, petitioner's claim for exemption because of
his wife's dependency was denied by the draft tribunals,
and he was inducted into the Army. Subsequently, he ab-
sented himself without leave and was held by the Army
authorities on that charge. The Court denied his applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, saying that although peti-
tioner's claim for exemption was improperly denied, yet
as he had been inducted into the Army, he was subject to
punishment for violation of Army discipline.
In the Bullard case," petitioner was given permission
to leave the country on a business trip. During his ab-
Ex parte Billings, 46 F. Supp. 663, 666 (D. C. Kan., 1942).
50 U. S. C. A. appendix 311.
S36 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. N. Y., 1941) aff'd 120 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941).
7 Ibid, 36 F. Supp. 917-918.
9 10 U. S. C. A. 1473.
9 254 Fed. 912 (D. C. Mass., 1919).




sence, petitioner's questionnaire was mailed to his last-
known address. As the questionnaire was not returned,
petitioner was placed in Class 1 and was reported to the
Adjutant General as a delinquent. Notice to report for
instructions was sent to petitioner and this inducted
him into service. Petitioner questioned the power of the
Army to try him by a court-marial. The Court held that
since petitioner had been inducted into the service in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Law, the Army had
jurisdiction over his person.
In the principal case, the sole question before the Court
was whether or not the petitioner had been inducted into
the Army. This was made to depend on whether taking
the oath was a necessary part of induction. Upon the an-
swer to this question rested the authority of the Army to
try petitioner for the offense of disobeying his superior
officer.
The Court carefully considered the rules and regula-
tions relating to induction which were promulgated by the
President. 12 A pertinent provision was Regulation 429
which stipulated that "after examination at the induction
station, the selected men found acceptable will be inducted
into the land and naval forces. An officer of the Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps will administer a prescribed oath to
each of the men. He will then inform them that they are
members of the land and naval forces and will explain
their obligations and privileges." It seems that under this
wording, it might be contended that induction is not com-
plete until the oath has been taken. However, the provi-
sion was subsequently amended so as to read: "At the
induction station, the men found acceptable will be in-
ducted into the land or naval forces."' 8 This language is
susceptible of but one meaning; the failure to take the oath
cannot operate as a bar to a person's being inducted into
the service. Induction takes place when the individual
is found acceptable, and the taking of the oath is a mere
formality. As the Court expressed it: "Induction is com-
pleted upon acceptance by the government and irrespec-
tive of the desires, acts and mental attitudes of the party
affected. Upon acceptance by the government, induction
occurs by operation of law. It is something over which
the party affected . . . has no control. It is not the ac-
1250 U. S. C. A. appendix 310 (a) : "The President is authorized (1) to
prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of
this Act . . ."
- Sec. 638.9.
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ceptance by him of the oath, but the acceptance by the
government of him as a soldier."
14
This ruling does not seem to go beyond what had al-
ready been indicated by the Bullard case,15 and is probably
a correct holding from the standpoint of effecti've adminis-
tration of the Selective Training and Service Act. One
should not be able to interpose a judicial delay of the
Army's treatment of him by declining to take the oath, if
he has foregone (or exhausted) the judicial remedies open
to him under the Selective Training and Service Act at the
date of his classification. 16
1, Ex parte Billings, 46 F. Supp. 663, 667-668 (D. C. Kan., 1942).
15 Supra, n. 9.
16 See Note, Judicial Review of Claasification by Selective Service System
(1943) 7 Md. L. Rev. 165, supra, this number.
